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YOU CAN'T TOUCH THIS: A LESSON TO
LEGISLATORS ON POLITICAL SPEECH
B. CHAD BUNGARD*
"Free speech is the whole thing, the whole ball game. Free
speech is life itself."' Yet, in America, as Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas eloquently argued, we now face a perverse
anomaly in First Amendment jurisprudence.2  According to the
Supreme Court, the First Amendment protects the Ku Klux Klan
leader who advocates lawlessness, 3 the protester who sews "f***
the [d]raft" on his jacket,4 the pornographer who transmits nudity
via the Internet,5 the business that distributes virtual child sex acts,
and a dancer who wants to perform nude in a bar-room type
setting. 7 And now, as Congress has successfully passed campaign
finance legislation banning political speech, are we to believe that
the First Amendment does not protect the speech of political
associations during an election campaign? Such a notion should be
* B. Chad Bungard is the Senior Counsel/Deputy Staff Director for the
U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency
Organization in Washington, D.C. Nothing in this article should be taken to
reflect the opinion of any Congressional member or staff of the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization and the U.S. House
Committee on Government Reform, other than that of the author. The author
would like to thank Attorney Emma K. Bungard for her significant efforts in the
development of this article. The author would also like to thank James Bopp, Jr.
for his tutelage and wisdom that he so kindly bestowed upon him and Attorney
Raeanna Moore for her invaluable assistance.
1. Salman Rushdie in Hiding, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 8, 1990, at 23; see
also Richard A. DiLiberto, Jr., Free Speech is Worth Guarantee, NEWS J.
(Delaware), Mar. 4, 2002, at A7.
2. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 411-12 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
3. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
4. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
5. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
6. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
7. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
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offensive to every American. As noted by campaign finance
expert James Bopp, Jr., "[t]he First Amendment was adopted not to
protect nude dancing or virtual child pornography, but was
intended to protect political speech."8  The Supreme Court
declared that the "First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent
application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office."
9
This article focuses on the constitutional sanctity of issue
advocacy communications' 0 and why legislation that regulates
8. Amy Keller, Campaign Reform Foes Cheered by Minnesota Case,
ROLL CALL, July 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8126303; see also Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 411 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In
his dissent, Justice Thomas stated:
Political speech is the primary object of First
Amendment protection. The Founders sought to
protect the rights of individuals to engage in political
speech because a self-governing people depends upon
the free exchange of political information. And that
free exchange should receive the most protection when
it matters the most-during campaigns for elective
office.
Id (citations omitted).
9. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); see
also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). In Buckley, the Court warned:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation
of the system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people."
Id. (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (citation omitted)).
10. Issue advocacy communications are those communications that
discuss a candidate and his position on issues but do not contain express or
explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 41-44. In Buckley, the Supreme Court distinguished issue advocacy
from express advocacy and held that communications that discuss a candidate
and his views are constitutionally protected as long as they remain outside the
narrow category of express advocacy. Id. at 43; see also Wanda Franz & James
Bopp, Jr., The Nine Myths of Campaign Finance Reform, 10 STAN L. & POL'Y
REv. 63, 63 (1998) ("Buckley held that political expenditures promoting a
[Vol. I
such speech is a "direct violation of the people's right to free
political speech, the right guaranteed to us by the First Amendment
of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United States of
America.""l  Part I discusses the constitutionality of the newly
passed federal campaign finance law, the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"),12 in regards to its prohibition of
"electioneering communications," which is broadly defined to
encompass issue advocacy communications. Part I focuses on
North Carolina's three failed attempts to regulate issue advocacy
communications. This article serves as a lesson to legislators:
issue advocacy communications are constitutionally sacrosanct and
the regulation of such is unconstitutional.
I. THE BCRA REGULATES THE HEART OF POLITICAL SPEECH-
ISSUE ADVOCACY COMMUNICATIONS
The Supreme Court will likely soon consider the
constitutionality of the BCRA.' 3 This act was passed by the House
candidate and his views are entitled to full First Amendment protection, so long
as they remain outside the narrowly circumscribed category of express
advocacy.").
11. 147 Cong. Rec. S3024 (2001) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
12. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (Mar. 27, 2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431). According to
Kenneth Doyle, the BCRA
is the biggest change in the nation's campaign finance
statutes since 1974, the year the Watergate scandal
reached its climax with President Nixon's resignation.
Enactment of the measure came about through a
special alignment of the stars. After a long, hard-
fought, and increasingly pragmatic lobbying effort by
reform groups-such as Common Cause and
others ....
Kenneth Doyle, By Any Name, New Law is Biggest Change in Campaign
Finance Since Watergate, BNA, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE TRANSFORMED, Apr. 22, 2002, at S-5.
13. A legal challenge to the BCRA is currently before a three-judge panel
of the federal district court in Washington D.C. The litigation is known as
McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-0582 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 2002). Pursuant to the
BCRA, a district court decision can be appealed directly to the United States
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and Senate respectively on February 14, 2002 and March 20, 2002,
and signed by the President into law on March 27, 2002.14
Notwithstanding the constitutional mandate that "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,'0 5 the effect and
purpose of the BCRA is to regulate core political speech, which
lies at the heart of First Amendment freedoms, and limit the
citizenry's right to speak out on political issues. Instead of abiding
by the First Amendment, Congress did the exact opposite by
enacting a law that abridges the freedom of speech. Campaign
finance reformers ("reformers") must somehow think that the
Constitution does not apply to political speech and speaking out on
public issues is unimportant. Although the BCRA has several
constitutional impediments, this article will discuss its biggest
constitutional flaw-the regulation and outright prohibition of
issue advocacy.' 6
Supreme Court. § 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. at 114 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 437(h)).
14. See Dan Balz, In Long Battle, Small Victories Added Up, WASH. POST,
Mar. 21, 2002, at A l; David Lightman, Finance Reform Passes in House;
Shays-Meehan Bill Changes How Money Is Raised, Spent, HARTFORD COURANT
(Connecticut), Feb. 14, 2002, at A1; Mary McGrory, McCain-Feingold Follies,
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at A29.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
16. President George W. Bush even has serious doubts as to the
constitutionality of the "electioneering communication" prohibition. When he
signed the act into law, he issued a statement saying:
I believe individual freedom to participate in elections
should be expanded, not diminished; and when
individual freedoms are restricted, questions arise
under the First Amendment. I also have reservations
about the constitutionality of the broad ban on issue
advertising, which restrains the speech of a wide
variety of groups on issues of public import in the
months closest to an election. I expect that the courts
will resolve these legitimate legal questions as
appropriate under the law.
President Signs Campaign Finance Reform Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
473 (Mar. 27, 2002).
[Vol. I
A. How it Works
Consider the following hypothetical situations that illustrate
the grave effects that the BCRA has on political speech:' 7
" The Sierra Club is criminally prohibited from running an
advertisement on the radio within sixty days of a general
election that merely informs the relevant electorate that
"congressional candidate X is not in favor of increasing
federal air pollution standards," even though the
advertisement does not expressly advocate for the
candidate's election or defeat.18
" Although pro-union legislation is scheduled for
congressional vote thirty days before an incumbent's
primary election, the AFL-CIO is criminally prohibited
from airing a television advertisement simply urging the
relevant electorate to call its Congressman to vote in favor
of the legislation.'
9
* A corporation is criminally prohibited from educating the
public on legislation by referring to the legislation by its
popular name. For example, if the BCRA were in effect
last year, it would have been a crime for a corporation to air
an advertisement on television sixty-days prior to a general
election that states: "The McCain-Feingold proposal will
end the most egregious problems in the current campaign
finance system. At the heart of the McCain-Feingold
proposal is an end to the hundreds of millions of dollars in
soft money contributions, the most corrupting money in
politics today." 2
0
* Sixty days before a general presidential election, Dan
Rather may state on a television broadcast that "George W.
Bush is pro-life. He wants to raise taxes. He has become
17. All of the following scenarios are in the federal election context.
18. See § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f));
§ 312(a), 116 Stat. at 106 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A)).
19. See § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434);
§ 312(a), 116 Stat. at 106 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(l)(A)).
20. See § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88; § 312(a), 116 Stat. at 106.
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soft on terrorism. And prescription drugs for senior
citizens is the least of President Bush's concerns."
2
'
Senator McCain frankly summed up the effects of the new law:
Our bill establishes a so-called bright line test
60 days out from a [general] election. Any
[issue ad] that falls within that 60-day
window could not use a candidate's name or
likeness. Ads could run which advocate any
number of causes. Pro-life ads, pro-choice
ads, anti-labor ads, pro-wilderness ads, pro-
Republican Party ads, pro-Democrat Party
ads-all could be aired in the last 60 days
[before a general election]. However, ads
mentioning the candidates could not.
22
Despite the shocking nature of such a premise that Congress would
ban political speech, the BCRA does exactly that. The BCRA
makes it illegal for a private citizen of this great country to merely
mention a candidate's name through the broadcast media at a time
when free speech matters most-right before an election. Now,
the only individuals who are legally permitted to use television or
radio to discuss a candidate or the candidate's position on issues
when it counts the most are the media and the candidates
themselves.23
21. See § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(3)(B)(i)(3)).
22. 143 CONG. REC. 10,002 (1997) (statement of Sen. McCain).
23. See 147 CONG. REc. 3,024 (2001) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
Senator DeWine has accurately described this problem:
[The BCRA] silences [the voices of the people) at a
time when it is most important for those voices to be
heard. It restricts citizens' ability to use the broadcast
media to hold incumbents accountable for their voting
records. It says essentially that the only people who
have a right to the most effective form of political
speech, the only people allowed to use television or
radio to freely express an opinion or to take a stand on
an issue when it counts, when it is within days of an
election, are the candidates themselves and the news
media.
[Vol. I
B. BCRA s Statutory Provisions
The BCRA prohibits an "electioneering communication"
by labor unions and all corporations, including 501(c)(4) nonprofit
corporations and nonprofit ideological corporations, that accept no
more than de minimis contributions. 4 Section 201(a) of the BCRA
defines "electioneering communication" as follows:
[A]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which.., refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office... 60
days before a general, special, or runoff
election for the office sought by the
candidate; or... 30 days before a primary or
preference election, or a convention or caucus
of a political party that has authority to
nominate a candidate, for the office sought by
the candidate; and ... in the case of a
communication which refers to a candidate
for an office other than President or Vice
President, is targeted to the relevant
electorate.25
In an apparent recognition of the unconstitutionality of the above
provision, the BCRA provides an alternative definition of
"electioneering communication" to be substituted in the event that
24. § 203(a), 116 Stat. at 91 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2)). The
prohibition found in section 203(a) plainly applies to all corporations, including
501(c)(4) organizations. Section 203(c), however, appears to create an
exception, permitting 501(c)(4) organizations to make "electioneering
communications" provided that "the communication is paid for exclusively by
funds provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or
nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence." § 203(c), 116 Stat. at
91. However, section 204 states that the exception does not apply if the
communication is "targeted"-broadcast to voters for the named candidate.
§ 204, 116 Stat. at 92 (adding § 316(c)(6) of Federal Election Campaign Act).
This effectively nullifies the exception provided in section 203(c) since
"target[ing] to the relevant electorate" is a prerequisite for a communication to
constitute an "electioneering communication." § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88 (to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)).
25. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)).
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the above provision is "held to be constitutionally insufficient by
final judicial decision." 26 That alternative definition provides:
[A]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which promotes or supports a
candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes
a candidate for that office (regardless of
whether the communication expressly
advocates a vote for or against a candidate)
and which also is suggestive of no plausible
meaning other than an exhortation to vote for
or against a specific candidate.
27
Violations of these above provisions can result in a prison sentence
and a substantial fine.28
It is also important to note that "[t]he term electioneering
does not include.., a communication appearing in a news story,
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any
broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled
by any political party, political committee, or candidate."29 As a
result, at a time when all other organizations are prohibited from
merely referring to a candidate, media companies may broadcast as
many of their own "electioneering communications" and programs
as they like. The media companies can go as far as endorsing
candidates for elections and talking adversely about other
candidates while editorializing on particular issues. In other
words, a nonprofit corporation, like the Sierra Club-funded by
annual dues from its members starting at $25 each-is prohibited
from even referring to a candidate; whereas, Rupert Murdoch's
FOX Network is free to use its general treasury funds to endorse its
26. Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)).
27. Id. Much to the dismay of the reformers, but certainly not a
revelation, this alternative definition is also an unconstitutional regulation of
issue advocacy. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
28. § 312(a), 116 Stat. at 106 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A)).
A violator may receive a maximum prison sentence from one to five years and
may be fined a substantial amount since the BCRA does not cap the amount of
any fine. Id.
29. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(i)).
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own candidates. 30  Under the BCRA, the public will now only
hear those viewpoints that the broadcast media deem worthy of
consideration.
C. The BCRA 's ban on corporations and labor unions making
an "electioneering communication" is an unconstitutional
regulation of issue advocacy
The BCRA effectively regulates what the Constitution
intended to protect: political speech. Recently, in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,3' the Supreme Court proclaimed:
[T]he notion that the special context of
electioneering justifies an abridgment of the
right to speak out on disputed issues sets our
First Amendment jurisprudence on its head.
"[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates"
is "at the core of our electoral process and of
the First Amendment freedoms," not at the
edges.3
2
James Bopp, Jr. and Richard Coleson accurately point out that the
"BCRA would virtually destroy the ability of citizen groups to
participate in our republic, thereby trampling on freedom of speech
and association with respect to the most vital issues of our day."
33
As demonstrated below, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have been quite clear; regulation of issue advocacy is
unconstitutional. Therefore, both "electioneering communication"
prohibitions run afoul of the First Amendment.
30. In First Nat'! Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Supreme Court
rejected the proposition that a "communication [made] by corporate members of
the institutional press is entitled to greater protection than the same
communication [made] by [non-media companies]." Id. at 782 n. 18.
31. 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
32. Id. at 2538 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 222-23 (1989)) (emphasis in original).
33. James Bopp Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Fatal Flaws in the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, BNA, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Apr. 22,
2002, at S-2 1, S-30.
2003]
22 FIRST AMENDMENT LA WREVIEW [Vol. 1
1. Free expression is vital and essential to representative
government.
In the seminal case of Buckely v. Valeo,34 the Supreme
Court expressed why issue advocacy communications need to be
free and unfettered from regulation. The Court held that
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report
for Congress, L. Paige Whitaker succinctly describes the holding of Buckley v.
Valeo:
In the 1976 landmark decision, Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court provided the genesis for the concept of
issue and express advocacy communications. In
Buckley, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) that applied to expenditures "relative to a
clearly identified candidate" and "for the purpose of
influencing an election." The Court found that such
provisions did not provide a sufficiently precise
description of what conduct was regulated and what
conduct was not regulated, in violation of First
Amendment "void for vagueness" jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the Court was concerned, under the
overbreadth doctrine, that the statute could encompass
not only communications with an electoral connection,
but could encompass constitutionally protected issue-
based speech as well. In order to avoid these
vagueness and overbreadth problems, the Court held
that the government's regulatory power under FECA
would be construed to reach only those funds spent for
communications that "include express words of
advocacy of the election or defeat" of a clearly
identified candidate. Hence, the Buckley Court began
to distinguish between communications that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate and those communications that advocate a
position on an issue. The Court found that the latter
type of communication is constitutionally protected
First Amendment speech and that only "express
advocacy" speech could be subject to regulation.
L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ISSUE AND EXPRESS
ADVOCACY 2 (Mar. 15, 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review).
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discussion of public issues and the qualifications of candidates is
"integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution." 35 It declared that "a major purpose" of the
First Amendment was to protect such political expressions to
ensure the unfettered exchange of ideas, which would result in
"political and social changes desired by the people." 36 In a nation
where the people are sovereign, it is absolutely essential that the
citizenry is able to make informed choices among the candidates
for public office. 37  After all, the individuals elected to public
office "inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.
' 3 8
Consequently, the Court issued a mandate that political discussion
remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
39
2. The Bright-Line "Express Advocacy" Test
The Buckley Court drew a bright-line distinction between
express advocacy and issue advocacy. This bright-line test allows
a speaker to determine what speech is subject to regulation. In the
campaign finance context, communications may not be regulated
unless they contain "express terms [that] advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." 40 In
Buckley, the Court provided examples of words that constitute such
"express advocacy": " 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your
ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
'reject.' 
"'41
The Court held that the citizenry should have the freedom
to engage in such political speech to the fullest, so that it is
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
36. Id. (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). The Buckley
Court affirmed, "it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has
its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office." Id. at 15 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
272 (1971)).
37. Id. at 14-15.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 14 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
40. ld. at 44.
41. Id. at 44 n.52.
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"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," without the fear of whether
one's words cross the line into regulation.42  A landowner is
permitted to enjoy the full fruits of his land up to the boundary,
without the fear of reprisal. Without a boundary, a landowner
would fear encroaching upon his neighbor's land and would not
use his land to the fullest. Likewise, without a bright-line test, a
speaker would be afraid to speak out on issues of public
importance, fearing that one's words would cross the line into
regulation. Thus, the Buckley Court created a bright-line boundary
to encourage free discussion of the issues, holding that "[s]o long
as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,
they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the
candidate and his views.
'A3
Reformers argue over and over that issue advertisements
that go right up to the line but do not advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate with express or explicit words are "sham" ads
and should be regulated because they intend to influence an
election result.44  Such an argument is specious. 45  A political
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. at 45.
44. One of these reformers, Senator John Edwards, stated:
[S]ham issue ads... are a fraud under the campaign
election laws that exist in this country.... I have one
or two examples. This is an ad run in a congressional
election in 1998: Announcer: The Daily reports
criminals are being set free in our neighborhoods. In
May, Congressman X voted to allow judges to let
violent criminals out of jail, rapists, drug dealers, and
even murderers. X's record on drugs is even worse. X
voted to reduce penalties for crack cocaine. And in
April, X voted to use your tax dollars to give free
needles to illegal drug users. Call X. Tell him he's
wrong. Dangerous criminals belong in jail. This
doesn't use the language used as illustrative by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Buckley. It doesn't say 'vote for;' it
doesn't say 'elect;' it says 'call.' But any rational
person, including all the people who watched this ad on
television, know that this ad is aimed at defeating
Congressman X in the campaign. That is exactly what
it is about.
[Vol. I
advertisement does not fall within the purview of regulation simply
because it intends to influence an election but avoids using express
or explicit words of advocacy.
The Court drew a bright line that errs on the side of
permitting communications that affect the election process but "at
all costs avoids restricting in any way, discussion of public
issues.' '46 The purpose and advantage of such a rigid approach is
to allow speakers to know at the outset what is permitted and what
is prohibited.47 Without such a rigid approach, there would be "no
security for free discussion. ' 48 It would compel "the speaker to
hedge and trim.' 49 As recognized by the Fourth Circuit in FEC v.
Christian Action Network,50 the bright-line test was necessary "so
that citizen participants in the political processes would not have
their core First Amendment right to political speech burdened by
apprehensions that their advocacy of issues might later be
147 CONG. REC. 3,040 (2001) (statement of Sen. Edwards). Senator Susan
Collins expressed a similar concern:
Unfortunately, some courts have interpreted 'expressly
advocating' to require that the ad use words such as
'vote for' or 'vote against' or 'elect' or 'defeat.' If the
ad avoids those magic words and makes at least a
passing reference to an issue, as the AFL-CIO did in
Maine, those courts concluded that it does not
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate, and the union may run it. Mr. President, the
situation I have described has led to the biggest sham
in American politics. Nobody in Maine believe[s] that
the AFL-CIO's negative ads were for any purpose
other than the defeat of a candidate.
143 CONG. REc. 10,125 (1997) (statement of Sen. Collins).
45. See Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional
Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 184-89 (1998) (arguing that
the reformers are "dramatically wrong" in advocating that issue advertisements
that intend to influence elections but avoid using express words of advocacy can
be regulated).
46. Me. Right to Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D. Me. 1996),
aff'dper curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
47. See id. at 12.
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535
(1945)).
49. Id. (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 535).
50. 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997).
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interpreted by the government as, instead, advocacy of election
result."5'
The reformers behind the BCRA are unabashed in their
motives. They do not like the content of issue advocacy
communications that are broadcast on radio and television before
an election; thus, it was their design to gag the mouths of the
citizenry by creating a ban on issue advocacy. The reformers
simply do not like "negative" ads. Senator Tom Daschle called
issue advocacy the "'crack cocaine' of negative ads" because it is
both "potent" and "deadly. ' 52 Senator John McCain exclaimed,
"[t]hese [issue] ads are almost always negative attacks on a
candidate and do little to further healthy political debate. As we all
know, they are usually intended to defeat a candidate."53 Senator
Maria Cantwell boldly admitted that the BCRA is about inhibiting
the ability of outside interest groups from discussing a candidate in
a negative manner through the broadcast media.54
Notwithstanding the reformers dislike for negative ads, it is
clear that issue advocacy may influence the outcome of elections.
The Buckley Court noted that the "distinction between discussion
of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of
51. ld. at 1051.
52. 143 CONG. REC. 9,999 (1997) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
53. 143 CONG. REC. 10,002 (1997) (statement of Sen. McCain).
54. 148 CONG. REc. S2,117 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Cantwell) ("This [McCain-Feingold] bill is about slowing the ad war. It is about
calling sham issue ads what they really are. It is about slowing political
advertising and making sure the flow of negative ads by outside interest groups
does not continue to permeate the airwaves."); see also 145 CONG. REC. 12,606-
07 (1999) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("I think these issue advocacy ads are a
nightmare. I think all of us should hate them .... [T]hey just bash you and then
they say: Call Senator So-and-so .... So with one stroke... [w]e could get
some of this poison politics off television."); 144 CONG. REC. 917 (1998)
(statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("We are talking about a system which has
developed over the past couple of years which has seriously imposed upon us
unfairness as far as candidates are concerned who find themselves faced with
ads.., to change the election."); 144 CONG. REc. 10,419 (1997) (statement of
Sen. Wendell Ford) (stating that McCain-Feingold addresses the problem of
issue ads, which he describes "as a new-and sometimes devious-way that
unregulated money is issued to affect elections").
[Vol. I
candidates may often dissolve in practical application." '55 The
Court recognized that candidates are closely tied to public issues.56
The Court further explained:
Public discussion of public issues which also
are campaign issues readily and often
unavoidably draws in candidates and their
positions, their voting records and other
official conduct. Discussions of those issues,
as well as more positive efforts to influence
public opinion on them, tend naturally and
inexorably to exert some influence on voting
at elections.
57
In striking down the Federal Election Campaign Act's ceiling on
independent expenditures (which had been construed narrowly to
implicate only express advocacy), the Buckley Court assumed for
the sake of argument that large independent expenditures posed a
threat of corruption. 58 Nonetheless, the Court held that the limit
was not narrowly tailored to prevent corruption because unlimited
sums could still be spent on communications that did not contain
express advocacy, which, nonetheless, are made to support
candidates:
[A]ssuming, arguendo, that large independent
expenditures pose the same dangers of actual
or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do
large contributions, § 608(e)(1) does not
provide an answer that sufficiently relates to
the elimination of those dangers. Unlike the
contribution limitations' total ban on giving
large amounts of money to candidates,
§ 608(e)(1) prevents only some large
expenditures. So long as persons and groups
eschew expenditures that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
55. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976).
56. id.
57. id. at 42 n.50 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 875 (D.C. Cir.
1975)) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 45.
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identified candidate, they are free to spend as
much as they want to promote the candidate
and his views.
9
Like it or not, in America, the citizenry is free to criticize
candidates and discuss issues relating to candidates. The reformers
have attempted to prohibit the citizenry from broadcasting an
advertisement that holds them accountable for their actions. It is
clear that the new law was intended to insulate incumbent
officeholders from criticism. House Majority Leader Tom Delay
59. Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that when a law
burdens core political speech, the "exacting scrutiny" standard applies to ensure
that the regulation is "narrowly tailored" to an "overriding state interest."
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). The only
legitimate and compelling governmental interest that the Supreme Court has
recognized is the "prevent[ion] [of] corruption or the appearance of corruption."
FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985). Spending
money on issue advocacy communications does not implicate the state interest
of avoiding quidpro quo corruption of candidates or the appearance thereof and,
therefore, cannot be regulated. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-44; First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978). The Supreme Court has even rejected limits
on independent expenditures, communications expressly advocating the election
or defeat of a candidate, on three separate occasions because only large
monetary contributions to a candidate present the risk of quid pro quo
corruption. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,
617 (1996); Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 498; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-
50. In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated:
Unlike contributions [made to, candidates],....
independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may
prove counterproductive. The absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the
value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as
a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.
424 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added); see also Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 616
(citing the same); Nat ' Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 497 (quoting the same).
Thus, there is no recognized compelling governmental interest that justifies the
mere scintilla of regulation of issue advocacy communications, let alone the
outright prohibition of such communications as proscribed by the BCRA.
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correctly points out that the BCRA simply "strengthens
incumbents and makes it far harder for their constituents to hold
them accountable., 60  Senator Santorum has also noted the
reformer's goal of shielding incumbents. "If you do not think this
is an incumbent protection plan, I guarantee you have not been
listening. This is all about protecting incumbents." 6' The
reformers are under the misapprehension that when they run for
office it is "their election" and that the citizenry is not free to
criticize incumbents. 62  That is not what the Constitution and
Supreme Court precedent provide.
Issue advocacy is afforded absolute protection under the
First Amendment;63 only express advocacy, a very narrow class of
political speech, can be regulated.64  The Supreme Court
reaffirmed this rule in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 65
and the federal courts of appeal have faithfully followed suit,
66
60. 148 CONG. REc. 342 (2002) (statement of Rep. DeLay).
61. 148 CONG. REC. 2,132 (2002) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
62. Id.
63. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment
Needs No Reform: Protecting Liberty From Campaign Finance "Reformers,"
51 CATH. U.L. REv. 785, 836-37 (2002).
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
65. 479 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1986). The Court held that an expenditure
must constitute express advocacy to be subject to the FECA prohibition against
corporate use of treasury funds to make an expenditure "in connection with" any
federal election. Id. The Court noted that the Buckley Court adopted the
"express advocacy" test to distinguish discussion of issues and candidates,
which is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment, "from more
pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons." Id. at 249.
66. See Va. Soc'y for Human Life v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir.
2001); Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174,
1186-87 (10th Cir. 2000); Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2000);
Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 387 (2d Cir. 2000); Iowa
Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1999); N.C.
Right To Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1999); Va. Soc'y
For Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F.3d 268, 270 (4th Cir. 1998);
Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 506 (7th
Cir. 1998); FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir.
1997); Me. Right To Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D. Me. 1996),
aff'd per curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); FEC v. Christian Action Network,
894 F. Supp. 946, 951 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff'dper curiam, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir.
1996); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991); FEC v. Furgatch, 807
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along with numerous federal district courts. 6 7  Not one federal
court has held that the bright-line test should be expanded to
include communications beyond express or explicit words
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, consistently
rejecting all legislative attempts to regulate issue advocacy.
Some commentators believe that Furgatch v. FEC,6 8 a
Ninth Circuit decision, expands the "express advocacy" test
F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1987); FEC v. Cent. Long Island Tax Reform
Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
67. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO3, at 9-11
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment) (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review); Oklahomans for Life, Inc. v. Luton, CIV-
00-11 63C (W.D. Okla. Nov. 8, 2001) (order declaring statutory definitions of
"independent expenditures," "contribution," and "political action committee"
unconstitutional) (on file with the North Carolina First Amendment Law
Reviw); Cmty. Alliance for a Responsible Env't v. Leake, No. 5:00-CV-554-
BO(3), at 17 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2001) (order granting in part and denying in
part motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review); Va. Soc'y for Human Life v. FEC, 83
F. Supp. 2d 668, 676 (E.D. Va. 2000); S.C. Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Davis, No.
3:00-124-19, at 4-5 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2000) (order granting preliminary
injunction) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review); FEC v. Christian
Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 62 (D.D.C. 1999); Kansans for Life, Inc. v. Gaede,
38 F. Supp. 2d 928, 935 (D. Kan. 1999); Fla. Right to Life v. Mortham, No. 98-
770-CIV-ORL-19A, at 11 n.8, n.9 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 1999) (order granting in
part and denying in part motion for summary judgment) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review); FEC v. Freedom's Heritage Forum, No. 3:98 CV-
549-S, at 5-8 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 1999) (order granting in part and denying in
part motion to dismiss); Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d
766, 767 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich., Inc. v.
Miller, 21 F.Supp. 2d 740, 742-43 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Right To Life of
Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Clifton v. FEC, 927 F. Supp. 493, 496 (D. Me. 1996), aft'd, 114 F.3d 1309 (1st
Cir. 1997); West Virginians For Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954, 959 (S.D.
W. Va. 1996); FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 1994 WL 9658, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 65 F.3d 285 (2d Cir.
1995); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448,
1456 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); FEC v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp.
428, 433 (D.D.C. 1989); FEC v. Am. Fed'n of State, Courtyard Mun.
Employees, 471 F. Supp. 315, 316-17 (D.D.C. 1979).
68. 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
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beyond express or explicit words. This is simply not true. The
holding in Furgatch requires that for a communication to be
deemed express advocacy and thus subject to regulation, it must
"4present a clear plea for action." 69 When determining whether
regulation of political speech is permissible, moreover, the
emphasis must always be on the literal words of the
communication. The Furgatch court held that explicit words of
advocacy are required to support regulation of political speech
regarding candidates.7'
In Furgatch, the Federal Election Commission brought suit
against Harvey Furgatch, who had placed a newspaper
advertisement that was critical of President Jimmy Carter in the
New York Times one week prior to the 1980 presidential
election.72 The Ninth Circuit focused its decision on the words of
the advertisement, holding that "Don't Let Him Do It" was a "clear
plea for action" that expressly advocated Carter's defeat.73 The
words were "simple and direct" words of "command," which
"'expressly advocate[d]' action of some kind. 74  The Ninth
Circuit pointed out that "speech that is merely informative" was
not regulated by the Act.
75
The Furgatch court focused on the literal words,
concluding that the language of Furgatch's advertisement
"expressly advocated" by issuing a "command" that the public
vote against Carter.76 In fact, the court pointedly noted that
"context cannot supply a meaning that is incompatible with, or
69. Id. at 864.
70. Id. at 861-62.
71. Id.; see also Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d at 1053 ("[T]he entire
premise of the [Furgatch] court's analysis was that words of advocacy such as
those recited in footnote 52 [in Buckley] were required to support Commission
jurisdiction over a given corporate expenditure.").
72. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 857-58.
73. Id. at 864-65; see also Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d at 1053
("The court's almost exclusive focus on 'speech,' and specifically 'speech'
defined as the literal words or text of the communication, could not have been
any clearer.. ").
74. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864; see also Christian Action Network, 110
F.3d at 1054.
75. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864.
76. Id.; see also Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d at 1054.
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simply unrelated to, the clear import of the words. 7 7 Moreover, a
communication's effect upon a listener is irrelevant when
considering whether there is a clear plea for action advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate, through literal, express or explicit
words.78 Thus, the Furgatch court did not expand the Buckley
standard; literal, express or explicit words of advocacy are required
before a political communication can be regulated.79
Because both the primary and alternative "electioneering
communications" definitions found in the BCRA not only regulate
issue advocacy communications, but explicitly ban them 60 days
before a general election and 30 days before a primary election,
both definitions run blatantly afoul of Buckley and are facially
unconstitutional. Both statutes unabashedly ban communications
that do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate through express or explicit words.
First, the primary definition bans speech that merely
"refers" to a candidate, effectively sweeping in all issue advocacy
communications and ignoring the bright-line "express advocacy"
test.80 Thus, it is clearly an unconstitutional regulation of issue
advocacy communications. 81 Second, although it was intended to
77. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864.
78. See Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969 (8th
Cir. 1999) ("Questions of intent and effect, however, are to be excluded from the
[express advocacy] analysis, since a speaker, in such circumstances, could not
safely assume how anything he might say would be understood by others.").
79. In fact, the Furgatch court noted that the statute at issue only regulated
"advocacy" that amounted to a clear plea for action. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864.
It further noted that "speech that is merely informative is not covered by the
Act." Id.
80. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 201(a), 116 Stat. 81, 88 (Mar. 27, 2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i)).
81. See Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 766
(W.D. Mich. 1998); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 740, 745-46 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that a similar rule that banned
corporate and labor union communications made within 45 days of an election
that merely contained the "name or likeness of a candidate" was an
unconstitutional regulation of issue advocacy); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 43-44 n.52 (1976) (listing examples of words that constitute express
advocacy).
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be a closer call constitutionally, the alternative definition does not
even come close to passing constitutional muster. The definition
explicitly sweeps in communications "regardless of whether...
[they) expressly advocate a vote for or against a candidate."82
Therefore, the alternative definition is also unconstitutional since it
ignores the bright-line "express advocacy" test. However, even if
it did not contain such issue advocacy inclusion language, the
definition is ambiguous in what would constitute "an exhortation
to vote for or against a specific candidate." 83 As the Eighth Circuit
noted, "[q]uestions of intent and effect.., are to be excluded from
the [express advocacy] analysis, since a speaker, in such
circumstances, could not safely assume how anything he might say
would be understood by others. 84 Thus, the alternative definition
is also unconstitutionally vague because ordinary people cannot
know whether their speech constitutes an "electioneering
communication."
85
II. NORTH CAROLINA'S THREE FAILED ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ISSUE ADVOCACY
Unfortunately, the campaign finance reformers behind the
BCRA are not alone. Legislators throughout the country have
attempted to regulate issue advocacy. However, federal courts,
relying on Buckley, have routinely struck down this regulation.
86
82. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)).
83. Id.
84. Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir.
1999).
85. A penal statute is void for vagueness if ordinary people cannot
understand what conduct is prohibited and if the statute encourages arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)
(stating that "laws [must] give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he can act accordingly"); see
also Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Elliot v.
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv., U. S. Dep't of Agric.,
990 F.2d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 1993) ("A law is considered vague if 'a person of
normal intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."'
(quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)) (emphasis added).
86. See supra notes 66-67.
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The State of North Carolina attempted to regulate
constitutionally protected issue advocacy on three separate
occasions. All three times, the laws were stuck down as being an
unconstitutional regulation of political speech.87 North Carolina's
unsuccessful efforts serve as a stark lesson to legislators:
regulation of issue advocacy, in any way, is unconstitutional.
A. North Carolina's First Attempt
On September 27, 1996, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc.
("NCRL"), a 501(C)(4) nonprofit organization under the Internal
Revenue Code, brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the
constitutionality of North Carolina's definition of political
committee on the grounds that it encompassed organizations that
solely engaged in issue advocacy. 88 NCRL also alleged that its
major purpose as defined in its articles of incorporation was not to
nominate or elect candidates, but rather to educate North
Carolinians regarding pro-life issues.89 Prior to the 1996 general
election, NCRL became concerned that if it issued its voter guide,
which did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate, but merely discussed issues of public concern, including
candidates' positions on those issues, it would be considered a
political committee pursuant to section 163-278.6 (14) of the North
Carolina General Statutes. 90
Section 163-278.6(14) defined political committee as "a
combination of two or more individuals, or any person, committee,
association, or organization, the primary or incidental purpose of
87. See Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that section
163.278.12A of the North Carolina General Statutes was unconstitutional
because it defined "political committee" too broadly); N.C. Right To Life, Inc.
v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that section 163-
278.6(14) was unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulated groups engaged
in issue advocacy); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3)
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment) (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review).
88. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 708-09.
89. Id. at 708.
90. Id. at 709.
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which is to support or oppose any candidate or political party or to
influence or attempt to influence the result of an election." 91 If
NCRL was considered a political committee, the consequences
would have been "substantial"-it would have been "required to
register as such, keep detailed records of its expenditures and
contributions, and file organizational and financial reports with the
State. 92  The district court held that the political committee
definition was unconstitutional.93 In doing so, the court stated:
Groups engaging only in issue advocacy are
thus subject to spending restrictions and
reporting requirements. This violates the First
Amendment, as construed by the Supreme
Court in Buckley v. Valeo. The Buckley Court
noted that, while a statute may target "those
expenditures that expressly advocate a
particular election result," it may not target
funds used for general issue advocacy. By
this standard, section 163-278.6(14) is fatally
overbroad: it does not limit its coverage to
entities engaging in express advocacy. 94
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision
and struck down North Carolina's definition of "political
committee." 95 The State attempted to lure the federal court into
ignoring the state statute's plain terms and unauthoritatively
narrowing it to cover only express advocacy communications. 9
6
The Fourth Circuit, however, stated that "[t]o accept the State's
proffered interpretation would read references to influencing
elections (a classic form of issue advocacy) right out of the
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6 (14) (1995).
92. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 712 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(14),
§ 163-278.7(b), § 163-278.8, § 163-278.9, and § 163-278.11).
93. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 3 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (E.D.N.C.
1998).
94. Id. at. 679-80 (internal citation omitted).
95. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 713.
96. Id. at 710.
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statute.,97 As a result, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the statute
was overly broad because it regulated groups engaged in only issue
advocacy as opposed to express advocacy of a candidate.
98
B. North Carolina s Second Attempt
In response to the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Bartlett, the
North Carolina legislature redesigned its campaign finance regime
in 1999. This new scheme included a new "political committee"
definition, section 163-278.6(14) of the North Carolina General
Statutes. However, instead of complying with the constitutional
boundaries set forth in the Fourth Circuit's decision, the legislature
sought to circumvent the judicial determination. Thus, like the
previous statute that was held unconstitutional, North Carolina's
new definition of political committee swept within its ambit both
groups that incidentally engaged in express advocacy and groups
that solely engaged in issue advocacy.
In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, NCRL again
brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of
North Carolina's definition of "political committee" 99 on the
grounds that it encompassed organizations that engaged solely in
97. Id. at 713; see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577
(1996) ("[O]nly state courts may authoritatively construe state statutes."). The
Supreme Court has noted:
It has long been a tenet of First Amendment law that in
determining a facial challenge to a [state] statute, if it
be "readily susceptible" to a narrowing construction
that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld.
The key to application of this principle is that the
statute must be "readily susceptible" to the limitation;
we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to
constitutional requirements.
Virginia v. Am. Booksellers, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).
98. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 713 (concluding that "burdening speech [in this
manner] is unacceptable in an area of such crucial import to our representative
democracy").
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(14) (1999).
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issue advocacy.' 00 It also challenged North Carolina's test for
"support or oppose" 1 on the grounds that it encompassed issue
advocacy communications and triggered the political committee
definition.'0 2
Section 163-278.6(14) defined "political committee" as an
"organization, or other entity that makes, or accepts anything of
value to make, contributions or expenditures and has one or more
... [enumerated] characteristics."' 0 3 One of these characteristics
was that the entity "[h]as as a major purpose to support or oppose
the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified
candidates. ' 04 This major purpose was "rebuttably presumed" if
the entity "contributes or expends or both contributes and expends
during an election cycle more than ... ($3 000). ' ' 105 "Expend" was
defined as "anything of value whatsoever.., to support or oppose
the nomination, election or passage of one or more clearly
identified candidates, or ballot measure[s].' '0 6 "Major purpose"
was not defined in section 163-278.6 of the article which regulates
contributions and expenditures in political campaigns.1
0 7
To determine whether an organization spent money "to
support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more
clearly identified candidates,"'10 8 one was required to look at
100. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:00-CV-798-BO(3), at 7-10
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001); see also N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 498, 502 (E.D.N.C. 2000).
101. See§ 163-278.14A.
102. The author represented NCRL in this litigation and conducted
depositions of the following defense witnesses, the transcripts of which are on
file with the First Amendment Law Review: Deposition of Gary Osborne
Bartlett, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3) (E.D.N.C.
Oct. 24, 2001); Deposition of Philip Baddour, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001); and Deposition of Wilbur
Gulley, III, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3)
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001).
103. § 163-278.6(14).
104. Id (emphasis added).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. § 163-278.6(9) (emphasis added).
107. See § 163-278.6.
108. § 163-278.6(14).
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section 163-278.14A. 10 9 Under this section, explicit words of
advocacy of the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates
were only one means of establishing that an entity has spent money
to support or oppose candidates."10 The North Carolina Board of
Elections was also permitted to look at the "essential nature" of the
communication, and if the course of action was unclear, to review
"contextual factors," such as: "the timing of the communication,"
"the distribution of the communication to a significant number of
registered voters," and "the cost of the communication" using the
standard of a "reasonable person['s]" interpretation.' Section
14A went even further by providing that the above factors were
"not necessarily the exclusive or conclusive means[] of proving
that an individual or other entity acted to 'support or oppose' " a
clearly identified candidate." 2 Section 14A simply allowed the
trier of fact to look at a number of subjective factors to determine
whether a communication fell within subsection (a)(2)." 3
109. § 163-278.14A.
110. § 163-278.14A(a)(1).
111. § 163-278.14A(a)(2).
112. § 163-278.14A.
113. Section 163-278.14A of the North Carolina General Statutes read:
[e]ither of the following shall be means, but not
necessarily the exclusive or conclusive means, of
proving that an individual or other entity acted 'to
support or oppose the nomination or election of one or
more clearly identified candidates:
(1) Evidence of financial sponsorship of
communications to the general public that use phrases
such as "vote for", "reelect", "support", "cast your
ballot for", "(name of candidate) for (name of office)",
"(name of candidate) in (year)", "vote against",
"defeat", "reject", "vote pro-(policy position)" or "vote
anti-(policy position)" accompanied by a list of
candidates clearly labeled "pro-(policy position)" or
"anti-(policy position)", or communications of
campaign words or slogans, such as posters, bumper
stickers, advertisements, etc., which say "(name of
candidate)'s the One", "(name of candidate) '98",
"(name of candidate)!, or the names of two candidates
joined by a hyphen or slash.
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Under North Carolina's scheme, "[t]he definition of
'political committee' ha[d] broad implications for the First
Amendment rights of entities that are regulated as such, as well as
for individuals that belong to and contribute them." 1 4 A political
committee was required to appoint a treasurer," 15 who, in turn, was
required to file a statement of organization, 1 6 keep detailed
accounts of all contributions received and expenditures made,'
and file periodic statements with the Board.' 18 If an organization
failed to comply with these requirements, it may have been subject
to prosecution for a Class 2 misdemeanor,"19 as well as civil late-
filing fines.'
20
NCRL claimed that because section 163-278.6(14) of the
North Carolina General Statutes relied on section 163-
278.14A(a)(2), which permitted the trier of fact to look at issue
(2) Evidence of financial sponsorship of
communications whose essential nature expresses
electoral advocacy to the general public and goes
beyond a mere discussion of public issues in that they
direct voters to take some action to nominate, elect, or
defeat a candidate in an election. If the course of
action is unclear, contextual factors such as the
language of the communication as a whole, the timing
of the communication in relation to the events of the
day, the distribution of the communication to a
significant number of registered voters for that
candidate's election, and the cost of the communication
may be considered in determining whether the action
urged could only be interpreted by a reasonable person
as advocating the nomination, election, or defeat of that
candidate in that election.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. Cmty. Alliance for a Responsible Env't v. Leake, No. 5:00-CV-554-
BO(3), at 8 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2001) (order granting in part and denying in part
motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction) (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review).
115. § 163-278.7
116. § 163-278.9(a)(1).
117. § 163-278.8.
118. § 163-278.9(4(a)); § 163-278.11.
119. § 163-278.27.
120. § 163-278.22(14); § 163-278.34.
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advocacy communications to determine whether a speaker
supports or opposes the election of a candidate,' 2 1 both sections
were unconstitutional because they regulated issue advocacy.' 
22
1. Section 163-278.6 (14) is declared an unconstitutional
regulation of issue advocacy.
As discussed above, to determine whether an organization
has spent money "to support or oppose the nomination or election
of one or more clearly identified candidates," one was required to
look at section 163-278.14A. Under this section, explicit words of
advocacy of the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
were only one means of establishing that an entity has spent money
to support or oppose a candidate and thereby subjected itself to
regulation as a political committee. Section 163-278.14A(a)(1)
focused on the words of the communication-encompassing all
communications that in express or explicit words advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate by including
"communications to the general public that use phrases such as,"
followed by a non-exhaustive list of examples. Whereas, section
163-278.14A(a)(2) encompassed communications that do not
contain express or explicit words advocating the election or defeat
of a candidate, permitting the trier of fact to look beyond what is
actually said in analyzing whether a speaker has made a
communication that supports or opposes the nomination or
election of one or more clearly identified candidates. 23
121. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3), at 5
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (noting that once a communication is deemed to be
"express advocacy" under section 163-278.14(a)(2), it will qualify as an
"expenditure" for purposes of determining "political committee" status under
section 163-278.6(14)).
122. Verified Complaint of Plaintiff at 2, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001).
123. Cmty. Alliance for a Responsible Env't v. Leake, No. 5:00-CV-554-
BO(3), at 12-13 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2001) (order granting in part and denying in
part motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review) ("[T]he 'essential nature' inquiry
[found within section 163-278.14A(a)(2)] allow[ed] regulators to [look beyond
express or 'explicit language' and] take into account certain 'contextual factors'
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Therefore, section 163-278.6(14) fell within. the purview of
danger that the Fourth Circuit had warned against.124 A group's
"major purpose" could have been derived from the contextual
factors listed in section 163-278.14A(a)(2), if the "essential nature"
of the inquiry was unclear.' z5  Thus, under North Carolina's
definition of "political committee," if an organization used ads that
did not contain express or explicit words advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate, it could have still been
subject to regulation. 126
One of the reasons the Bartlett court struck down North
Carolina's previous political committee definition was because it
"subject[ed] groups engaged in only issue advocacy to an intrusive
set of reporting requirements."' 127 In that case, the court recognized
that such issue advocacy regulation " 'blankets with uncertainty'
the entire field of campaign politics 'compelling the speaker to
hedge and trim.' ,,128 The Fourth Circuit issued a stem warning:
"[b]urdening speech of this sort [issue advocacy] is unacceptable
in deciding whether a communication is made to 'support or oppose' the
nomination or election of a candidate.").
124. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Perry v. Bartlett:
In an effort to alleviate uncertainty, the Supreme Court
adopted a bright-line rule to determine when political
expression may be regulated. This bright-line rule
requires the use of express or explicit words of
advocacy of the election or defeat of a candidate before
the communication may be regulated.... The
[Supreme] Court therefore refused to adopt a standard
allowing regulation of any advertisement that mentions
a candidate's stand on an issue.
231 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-43
(1976)).
125. See Cmty. Alliance for a Responsible Env't, No. 5:00-CV-554-BO(3),
at7.
126. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 712 (4th Cir. 1999)
(noting that "political committee [was] defined in such a way that it could [have
been] interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion.") (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79).
127. Id. at 713.
128. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
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in an area of such crucial import to our representative
democracy."' 29
Just as it did before, North Carolina's "political committee"
definition once again regulated issue advocacy discussion. The
case of Community Alliance for a Responsible Environment v.
Leake130 illustrates this point. In that case, the State Board of
Elections found that Community Alliance for a Responsible
Environment ("CARE") was a political committee under section
163-278.6(14) of the North Carolina General Statutes.' 31
According to the State Board, CARE was a political committee
because it made expenditures to oppose the election of Glen Lang,
who was running for mayor in the town of Cary, North Carolina.
32
As the district court pointed out, "while CARE's
advertisements no doubt painted Glen Lang in a poor light, they
were pure issue advocacy."'33 Yet the Board concluded that these
issue advocacy communications qualified CARE as a political
committee, 134 basing its decision "upon a number of supporting
facts that would qualify as 'contextual' factors under N.C. G.S.
§ 163-278.14A(a)(2)."' 35  The CARE court held that although it
was possible for the Board to make such a conclusion under the
Statutes, "this determination [was] unconstitutional" in this case. 36
129. ld. at 713.
130. Cmty. Alliance for a Responsible Env', No. 5:00-CV-554-BO(3).
131. Id. at 12-13.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 16 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976))
(emphasis added). In fact, the court found that
[i]n all of its time sponsoring advertisements during the
period of the mayoral election and thereafter, CARE
never engaged in 'express advocacy' as none of its
fliers, printed advertisements, or radio spots
'contain[ed] express words of advocacy of election or
defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your
ballot for,' . .
Id.
134. Id. at 15.
135. ld. at 14.
136. Id. at 15-16 (order granting in part and denying in part motion for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review).
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Therefore, the court held that sections 163-278.6(14) and 163-
278.14A were unconstitutional as applied to CARE since they
"infringe[d] upon CARE's protected right to engage in issue
advocacy."' 37
In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, the district
court once again held that section 163-278.6(14) was
unconstitutional 38 As discussed earlier, the Buckley Court noted
that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates
and advocacy [of issues] and candidates may often dissolve in
practical application."' 39 Thus, the Court declined to accept a
standard that would allow the regulation of a communication that
simply discusses a candidate's position on an issue. 14  Therefore,
the district court ruled section 163-278.6(14) unconstitutional since
it "impermissibly regulate[d] issue advocacy" by relying on section
163-278.14A(a)(2) to determine whether an organization is
deemed a political committee.'1
4
2. Section 163-278.14A(a)(2) is declared an unconstitutional
regulation of issue advocacy since it "clearly violated the 'express
advocacy' test."
Section 163-278.14A(a)(2) was used to determine whether
an organization acted "to support or oppose the nomination or
election of one or more clearly identified candidates" and thus was
subject to regulation as a political committee. The Fourth Circuit
unequivocally held that the regulation of campaign speech can "be
applied consistently with the First Amendment only if it [is]
limited to expenditures for communications that literally include
words which in and of themselves advocate the election or defeat
137. Id. at 17.
138. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3), at 7
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment) (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review).
139. 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976).
140. Id. at 43-44; see also Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir.
2000); supra Part I.C.2.
141. N.C. Right to Life, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3), at 7.
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of a candidate."' 142 In fact, "[t]he Fourth Circuit has steadfastly
adhered to the bright-line 'express advocacy' test from Buckley"
and has expressly repudiated looking beyond express or explicit
words advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.14 Other
circuit court decisions addressing the regulation of issue advocacy
"have categorically rejected any attempt to dilute the bright-line
express advocacy standard."'
145
Notwithstanding the constitutional sanctity of issue
advocacy, like Congress did this year when it adopted the BCRA,
the 1999 North Carolina General Assembly adopted section 163-
278.14A, a law that regulates issue advocacy. 46 NCRL argued
142. FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir.
1997) (emphasis added); see also Perry, 231 F.3d at 160.
143. Perry, 231 F.3d at 160.
144. See Christian Action Network, I 10 F.3d at 1064.
145. Perry, 231 F.3d at 161; see also supra notes 66-67.
146. It was the full intention of the General Assembly to regulate
advertisements that avoided express or explicit words of advocacy but had the
intention of electing or defeating a candidate. These types of advertisements
were commonly referred to by the statute's proponents as "sham" or "phony"
issue ads. See Hunt Signs Reform Law, GOLDSBORO NEWS-ARGUS, Aug. 13,
1999, at 5A. In fact, Senator Gulley, the lead sponsor of the Senate legislation
that contained section 163-278.14A, confirmed this legislative purpose at his
deposition. See Deposition of Wilbur Paul Gulley at 63, 99-100, N.C. Right to
Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review). Further, when asked why he and the
General Assembly did not stop at the first paragraph, section 163-278.14A(a)(1),
instead of including subsection 14A(a)(2) within the regulatory ambit, Gulley
admitted that "(a)(1) doesn't in my judgment do much more than recite existing
federal law, so that is already the law. The effort was to acknowledge that
statutorily, but then go on to try and reach beyond that to-again, to express
advocacy that is masquerading as issue advocacy." Id. at 66, 101-02; see also
Deposition of Philip A. Baddour at 73-74, 77, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001); Deposition of Gary Osborne
Bartlett at 17, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3)
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review). The
State claimed that section 163-278.14A(a)(2) is a proper regulation of "covert
speech"-speech that promotes a candidate and his position on issues but
"shrewd[ly] and evasive[ly]" avoids express or explicit words. Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reply to Plaintiff's Amended Response to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment at 17, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-
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that the consideration of such factors, beyond express or explicit
words of advocacy, could lead to arbitrary and subjective
enforcement by the Board. In fact, Gary Bartlett, the Board's
Executive Director, confirmed this possibility:
We have had a lot of discussion about 14A
and have had speculation and what ifs. If I
have to say of all the things that is in this
article, that is certainly the area that gives us
the biggest headache.... Because it is very
subjective and you basically need the Board
in specific cases to act as a-make a judicial
determination.1
4 7
Director Bartlett recognized that under subsection (a)(2) a speaker
could not tell from the face of the communication whether it
"&supports or opposes" the nomination or election of a candidate,
but instead, the speaker was forced to look at what other activities
were taking place.' 48  North Carolina House Majority Leader
Philip Baddour correctly noted that "[t]here is nothing in the
798-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001). The State contended that section 163-
278.14A(a)(2) properly regulated communications "that can only be understood
by a reasonable listener/reader to be an exhortation to take electoral action." Id.
at 18. However, "regulation of campaign speech [is only permissible] when
there are words of express advocacy in the communication itself." Perry, 231
F.3d at 161.
147. Deposition of Bartlett at 58, N.C. Right to Life (No. 5:99-CV-798-
BO(3)).
148. Id. at 18-20; see also Deposition of Baddour at 82-84, N.C. Right to
Life (No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3)). Because of the uncertainty created by
subsection (a)(2), North Carolina State Senator Gulley suggested that an
individual suppress his speech by choosing "some margin of error to be on the
safe side." Deposition of Gulley at 69, N.C. Right to Life (No. 5:99-CV-798-
BO(3)). Such a suggestion, in and of itself, runs afoul of the First Amendment.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("Discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualification of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution."); see also Perry, 231
F.3d at 160 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42) ("[T]o alleviate uncertainty, the
Supreme Court adopted a bright-line rule to determine when political expression
may be regulated," requiring "the use of express or explicit words of
advocacy.., before the communication may be regulated.").
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statute that limits the trier of fact from taking anything into
consideration."1
49
According to Director Bartlett, "each circumstance[] must
be looked at on an individual basis. You cannot have a cookie
cutter approach to everything except for express advocacy."' 50
Director Bartlett's admission recognizes that subsection (a)(2) did
not provide the clear bright-line, which subsection (a)(1) provides,
so that a speaker will know from the outset whether his speech
supports or opposes the election or defeat of a candidate. In
holding that the inclusion of express words of advocacy were
constitutionally required before a communication could be
regulated, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Citizens For Life,
Inc. pointed out that express or explicit words of advocacy were
also indispensable in identifying express advocacy.'
51
The "essential nature" test permitted the Board to ignore
whether a communication uses express or explicit words of
advocacy152 and allowed the Board to arbitrarily decide what
speech fell within the regulatory ambit of subsection (a)(2). 53
Allowing the Board to focus on the "essential nature" of the
communication, rather than the words, unacceptably burdens issue
149. Deposition of Baddour at 57, N.C. Right to Life (No. 5:99-CV-798-
BO(3)).
150. Deposition of Bartlett at 20, N.C. Right to Life (No. 5:99-CV-798-
BO(3)) (emphasis added).
151. 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986); see also Citizens for Responsible Gov't
State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000).
152. See Cmty. Alliance for a Responsible Env't v. Leake, No. 5:00-CV-
554-BO(3), at 7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2001) (order granting in part and denying in
part motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review).
153. Director Bartlett admitted that even in cases where there were "no
such 'express words of advocacy' were present, the Board might nonetheless
find that a communication constituted express advocacy if its essential nature
was unclear." N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3), at 8
(E.D. N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (order denying motion for summary judgment) (citing
Deposition of Gary Bartlett at 38) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review). He further noted that "it is the cumulative whole that lets you use
[subsection (a)(2)] or not... including the timing[] [and] the amount of money
spent in a specific period of time." Id.
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advocacy communications, which is "an area of such crucial
import to our representative democracy."' 54
Further, a look at the contextual factors, when the course of
action is unclear, goes beyond the constitutional mandate. Factors
contextually external to the words actually expressed are irrelevant
to whether a communication expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a candidate. If a course of action is unclear, it is just that.
Reference to factors beyond the words actually said violates the
"bright-line rule." The consideration of the aforementioned
factors shifts the focus to factors beyond the words actually said.
If the Board were permitted to look at the timing of the
communication as a determining factor, then the speaker would
never truly know if his speech fell within the regulatory ambit of
North Carolina's statutory scheme. The federal district court in
Maine recognized the problem of looking at timing as a
determining factor: "[w]hat is issue advocacy a year before the
election may become express advocacy on the eve of the election
154. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 713 (4th Cir. 1999).
The "essential nature" language employed in section 163-278.14A(a)(2) of the
North Carolina General Statutes was borrowed from the Supreme Court's
holding in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). In that
case, the Court evaluated a publication that "urges voters to vote for 'pro-life'
candidates" and "identifies and provides photographs of specific candidates
fitting that description." Id. at 249. The Court held that, while this
communication was "marginally less direct than 'Vote for Smith," this "does not
change its essential nature," which the Court held to be express advocacy of the
election of particular candidates. Id. The express advocacy nature of the
communication in Massachusetts Citizens for Life was marginally indirect only
because the clearly identified candidates and the clear plea to vote for them were
not contained within the same sentence, but, nonetheless, within the four comers
of the communication at issue. The problem with the North Carolina
legislature's use of the "essential nature" language is that the type of
communication at issue in Massachusetts Citizens for Life would actually fall
under subsection (a)(1), which lists uncontroverted illustrations of express
advocacy: "'Vote pro-(policy position)' or 'vote anti-(policy position)'
accompanied by a list of candidates clearly labeled 'pro-(policy position).' "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14A(a)(2) (1999). Subsection (a)(2) covered more
than the marginally indirect sort of express advocacy at issue in Massachusetts
Citizens for Life. The mere fact that it was unclear as to what communications
were covered in subsection (a)(2) demonstrates that it does not provide the
bright line required to avoid the stifling of political speech. See supra I.C.2.
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and the speaker must continually re-evaluate his or her own words
as the election approaches. That is sufficient evidence of First
Amendment 'chill' to entitle the plaintiffs to relief."' 55
Likewise, if the Board were permitted to focus on factors
such as the cost of the communication and the audience receiving
the communication, a speaker would be akin to a blind person on a
busy street with no seeing eye dog-the speaker would never know
when he fell within the purview of danger. It would compel "the
speaker to hedge and trim.'' 56 That is why the Supreme Court
drew a bright line that errs on the side of "permitting things that
affect the election process, but at all costs avoids restricting, in any
way, discussion of public issues."' 57 Under this rigid approach, the
speaker or writer has the advantage of knowing before the
communication is made whether it is permitted or prohibited.
58
Subsection (a)(2) blurred the bright-line even more where it
allowed a "reasonable person" to evaluate the context of the
communication to determine if it advocates the election or defeat
of a candidate. Director Bartlett even suggested that a "reasonable
person" standard "is very subjective. ' 59 More importantly, a
reasonable person's understanding of the communication is simply
irrelevant, and allowing such a standard violates Buckley's bright
and clear line, which is intended to allow the speaker to know in
advance of speaking whether his communications can be
regulated.' 60 The Buckley Court created the express advocacy test
so that a court's inquiry would focus on the language used in the
155. Me. Right to Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996),
aff'dper curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
156. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
157. Me. Right to Life Comm., 914 F. Supp. at 12.
158. See id.
159. Deposition of Gary Osbourne Bartlett at 21, N.C. Right to Life, Inc.
v. Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24 2001) (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review).
160. Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir.
1999) ("Questions of intent and effect.., are to be excluded from the [express
advocacy] analysis, since a speaker, in such circumstances, could not safely
assume how anything he might say would be understood by others.").
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communication.' 6 1 Otherwise, the speaker would be "wholly at the
mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and consequently
of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and
meaning."'
62
C. North Carolina's Third Attempt
In another attempt to regulate issue advocacy, the North
Carolina General Assembly enacted section 163-278.12A of the
North Carolina General Statutes.' 63  This section required any
entity making expenditures for printed material or advertisements
that name candidates with the intention of advocating such
candidates' election or defeat to report such expenditures to the
State Board of Elections as soon as such expenditures exceeded an
aggregate threshold of $3,000.'64
Farmers for Fairness ("Farmers"), an agricultural nonprofit
organization, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of
subsection 12A. 165 Farmers alleged that its purpose was to educate
the public, officeholders, and candidates on issues relating to the
agricultural and farming industries. 66 In order to effectuate this
purpose, Farmers provided the public with candidates' and/or
officeholders' positions on issues affecting agriculture and farming
but did not make communications expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate.
1 67
Acting in accordance with its purpose, Farmers purchased
advertising that was critical of certain members of the North
Carolina House of Representatives but did not expressly advocate
their defeat. 168  After receiving complaints from the named
161. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43; see also Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 2000).
162. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
535 (1945)).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12A (1999).
164. § 163-278.12A (referring to section 163-278.10A for $3,000
aggregate expense amount).
165. Perry, 231 F.3d at 159.
166. See id. at 158.
167. See id. at 159.
168. See id.
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candidates, the Board found that Farmers acted with the intent to
oppose the re-election of certain candidates, and in turn, violated
the reporting requirements in subsection 12A. 69  The Board
ordered Farmers to register as a political committee and comply
with a panoply of burdensome requirements simply because it
engaged in issue advocacy.17 0  The district court ruled that the
constitutionality of subsection 12A was mooted.171 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in its ruling.17 2
The Fourth Circuit unequivocally held that the Supreme
Court's "bright-line rule requires the use of express or explicit
words of advocacy of the election or defeat of a candidate before
the communication may be regulated."'173 The court stated that this
is so even if the speaker admits that the purpose of the issue
advocacy communication is to defeat a particular candidate. 174
The Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the State's argument that
there should be an exception to the "express advocacy" test when
the entity admits, outside of the communication, that it is trying to
defeat a particular candidate. 175
The court observed that allowing the regulation of issue
advocacy when the speaker acknowledges an intent to influence
the outcome of an election "would create a legal standard that
would be the antithesis of the bright-line express advocacy test
developed in Buckley.' ' 176 Consequently, the court held section
163-278.12A of the North Carolina General Statutes
169. Id. at 159.
170. See id.
171. id. at 160.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 161-62.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 161. As the court noted:
The Supreme Court developed the express advocacy
test to focus a court's inquiry on the language used in
the communications; any other test would leave the
speaker "wholly at the mercy of the varied
understanding of his hearers and consequently of
whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and
meaning."
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976)).
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"unconstitutionally overbroad" and "permanently enjoined [the
State] from enforcing it" since it "would allow the regulation of
issue advocacy."'
177
CONCLUSION
What have we learned from Buckley and its progeny?
Without a doubt, issue advocacy communications cannot be
prohibited. But that is not all; issue advocacy communications
cannot even bear a scintilla of regulation. Any attempts to regulate
such sacred speech will be declared unconstitutional and will result
in a waste of government resources and taxpayers' money.
What have we learned from the reformers? They want to
stifle the American citizenry's speech on political issues at the
most crucial time, immediately before an election. This is because
reformers are under the misapprehension that an election is their
election and their right to be free from criticism on television or
radio outweighs the citizenry's First Amendment right to hold
them accountable. To steal a word from the reformers, this is a
"sham."178
177. See id. at 162.
178. In discussing the Shays-Meehan bill, House Majority Leader Tom
Delay accurately stated,
This is a sham. It shuts down the system .... It shuts
down political speech. It shuts down the opportunity to
participate in elections. In a country the size of the
United States, an individual citizen has very little
chance of joining the political debate without banding
together with others, so by blocking citizens' groups
from participating in days leading up to an election,
Shays-Meehan removes a very vital tool that citizens
can use to hold elected officials accountable.
This is Swiss cheese. It is full of holes. It does not do
what the authors want. it is like a fine wine that does
not get better with age, it just rots.
148 CONG. REc. H339-02, H342 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Delay).
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